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Abstract
The concept of individuality in quantum mechanics shows radical differences from the one
used in classical physics. In particular, it is not possible to consider the fundamental par-
ticles described by quantum theory as individual distinguishable objects. In this paper we
present arguments in favor of quantum non-individuality, which —in addition to those based
on quantum statistics— relate to the Kochen-Specker theorem and the principle of super-
position. Then, we analyze the possibility of referring to ‘possible individuals’ instead of
‘actual individuals’, and show that the Modal-Kochen-Specker theorem precludes this inter-
pretational move.
1 Classical physics as a theory of entities
Using the opportunity of this interdisciplinary conference on the subject of Structure and Identity
we would like to present a paper which discusses the physical and philosophical problems engaged
with the interpretation of the formal structure of quantum mechanics in relation to the notions
of entity and identity.
Aristotle relates ‘identity’ to the concept of ‘entity’ via his formulation of logic. Plato had
designed this concept in order to escape the problem of movement in which Pre-Socratic phi-
losophy had based itself. The principles of Aristotelian logic, namely, the existence of objects of
knowledge, the principle of contradiction and the principle of identity, appear thus, as the condi-
tions of possibility to refer to an entity.1 But as stressed repeatedly by Martin Heidegger, since
Plato,2 philosophy has thought of Being —the most radical question regarding philosophy— in
the very specific terms of an entity, forgetting the question which guided philosophy in the first
place. Alfred North Whitehead also referred to this aspect of occidental philosophy mentioning
with an ironic glance that: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical
tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” [42]. In relation to physics, the idea
of entity played the most radical role in understanding phenomena, so in this very same sense, as
1See for discussion [40].
2We could add Aristotle as that whom structures the notion of entity beyond philosophy and constructs the
logical structure of it.
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discussed in [27, 28], we might say that the history of classical physics has been confined —since
Plato, but more specifically in relation to physics, since Aristotle— to the history of ‘physical
entities’, i.e. particles, waves, fields, etc.
The foundational revolution in mathematics and physics, which took place in between the
end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, shacked the very cornerstones of classical
thought. Quantum mechanics can be regarded as one of the most definite blows received by
the classical world-view. The impossibility to refer to an object, an individual, reflected the
limitations of the physics which had been thought until then, a physics which had been founded
on the concept of ‘entity’ and the logical structure of Aristotle. Expressing the idea that one
needs to apply the principle of identity to every entity, Heidegger states in Der Staz der Identita¨t
that the principle is a law of Being which states that identity —the unit with itself— pertains to
each entity as such. This principle —in the form ‘a = a’— belongs to the axioms of set theory,
which is in turn in the basis of the mathematics in which physical theories are axiomatized.
We will analyze the compatibility between the notions of entity and identity and the formal
structure of quantum mechanics. To do so, we assume that a certain description is determined
by a set of concepts which interrelate and that a concept is defined by its inter-relations to other
concepts. Identity and individuality are two main constituters of the notion of entity. In this
respect, many discussions tend to ‘dissect’ the concept of entity, as if, when tearing apart the
concept from its constituents they would be still allowed to talk about the same concept.3 But
the notion of individual and that of properties are interdefined notions. The individual entity
is constituted by the notions of existence, identity and contradiction (of properties obeying
classical logic), these are notions which interrelate and determine the concept of entity. The fall
of one of them causes the whole architectonic to loose its foundation and crumble down into
pieces.
We shall firstly review the standard analysis of quantum non-individuality of indistinguish-
able particles via the quantum statistics and comment an alternative approach to deal with
them from quasiset theory [4, 21], a landscape where the logical principle of identity has re-
stricted applicability. Then we present other challenges to individuality, namely those posed by
the Kochen-Specker theorem and the superposition principle. We also link the discussion on
quantum non-individuality to the interpretation of the Fock-space formalism, and relate it to
the philosophical problem of the one and the many. Finally we discuss, within the modal scheme
if it is achievable to retain, instead of the notion of ‘actual individual’, at least the notion of
‘possible individual’.
2 Individuality in quantum mechanics
Since the origins of quantum mechanics, problems appeared when attempts were made to inter-
pret its formalism and experiments. In particular, a major problem was found in relation to the
individuality of quantum systems. An expression of this problem can be found in [34], where
Erwin Schro¨dinger states that: “[...] we have [...] been compelled to dismiss the idea that [...]
a particle is an individual entity which retains its ‘sameness’ forever. Quite the contrary, we
are now obliged to assert that the ultimate constituents of matter have no ‘sameness’ at all.”
And continues: “I beg to emphasize this and I beg you to believe it: It is not a question of our
being able to ascertain the identity in some instances and not being able to do so in others. It
is beyond doubt that the question of ‘sameness’, of identity, really and truly has no meaning.”
Schro¨dinger extended his assertions in different works, for example:
“I mean this: that the elementary particle is not an individual; it cannot be
identified, it lacks ‘sameness’. The fact is known to every physicist, but is rarely
3This is discussed more deeply in [29].
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given any prominence in surveys readable by nonspecialists. In technical language it
is covered by saying that the particles ‘obey’ a newfangled statistics, either Einstein-
Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics. [...] The implication, far from obvious, is that the
unsuspected epithet ‘this’ is not quite properly applicable to, say, an electron, except
with caution, in a restricted sense, and sometimes not at all.” E. Schro¨dinger ([35],
p.197)
Schro¨dinger was in both cases specifically referring to what are called ‘indistinguishable parti-
cles’, the subject where these questions first arose. But it may be claimed that the whole formal
structure of quantum mechanics is in conflict with the notion of individuals, as we will discuss
below.
2.1 Quantum statistics: Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac
It is commonly argued that elementary particles (electrons, quarks, neutrinos, and so on) are
nomological objects: their characteristical properties are fixed by law. Particles of a given kind
—for example, electrons— are by definition all exactly equal to one another. Inside a class, they
are indistinguishable. Thus, following Leibniz, they would be all considered as one and the same
thing. In such case, one would have to admit that there is only one electron in the whole world
—something that is strongly denied by experiment [37].
Quantum theory prescribes a new way of counting electrons, photons and the like. Quanta
obey Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics, in opposition to classical systems, which obey
Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics.4 Consider two indistinguishable particles, for example electrons.
If particles were assumed to possess individuality, they could be labeled as ‘electron 1’ and
‘electron 2’. Suppose they have to be arranged in two boxes. If they were objects, then they
could actually be labeled because they may be at least distinguished by their positions —such
as ‘being in the left box’ or ‘being in the right box’— there are four possibilities: both electrons
in the left box, both in the right box, electron 1 in the left box and electron 2 in the right
box and viceversa. These ‘labeled’ electrons would obey Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics and all
four possibilities should be considered. Instead, quantum statistics impose that the two last
options, because there is no way of distinguishing which electron is 1 and which one is 2, have
to be considered as one and the same. If the particles were bosons, there would only be three
possibilities left, while if they were fermions, there would be only one —because, in addition, the
two first arrangements are prohibited for fermions by the Pauli exclusion principle. It is difficult
to justify this way of counting the possible arrangements if particles are assumed to posses
individuality and thus, the possibility of being labeled. This tension between individuality
and quantum statistics is usually given as a justification for the fact that indistinguishable
particles cannot be considered as individuals. However, the standard quantum formalism is
constituted in the mathematics based on set theory. But how could quantum non-individuals be
collected in sets when Cantor stated that sets may be regarded as “...collections of definite and
separate objects of our intuition or our thought”? In order to face this serious inconsistency,
there have been several proposed approaches to develop quantum set theories5 that acknowledge
indistinguishability “right from the start”. In these frames, the principle of identity has restricted
applicability.
There is, nevertheless, a standard way to deal with the subject of quantum statistics retaining
particle indexation. This is done by restricting the states available for the particles by imposing
that, if particles are indistinguishable, then they can only access symmetrized (with respect to
particle interchange) states if they are bosons, or antisymmetrized states if they are fermions.
4See [17] for a very complete review.
5See for example [5], [21], [22]. There are also other quantum set theories [10], [15], [16], [26], [32], [36] that
follow the suggestion made by von Neumann in relation to quantum logic.
3
All other states are prohibited or it is supposed that they are never realized in nature. This trick
of first labeling and then restricting the available states allows to reproduce quantum statistics
satisfactorily, without dropping particle indexation. But, as stated in [30], this procedure can be
criticized, for one should still acknowledge why there appear in the formalism ‘prohibited states’
which may be thus considered as “surplus structure”. In fact, there has been considerable work
around the existence of particles (‘paraparticles’) obeying other types of statistics (‘parastatis-
tics’). In [30] it is argued that, as long as parastatistics are never observed in nature, then the
usual procedure to construct the set of possible states —technically, the labeled tensor product
Hilbert space formalism— should be replaced by another one that does not index particles,
for example the Fock-space formalism. Though these formulations are not always equivalent,6
Fock-space formalism covers all experimental facts described by the standard formulation and
satisfies the requirement that particles are not labeled —so that no surplus structure appears
within it. It is important to remark however, that —as Steven French and De´cio Krause argue
in [17]— the formal construction of the Fock-space does use the standard set theoretical frame-
work, which presupposes classical individuality on its foundations. This seems to be, thus, not
a genuine solution.
The above outlined arguments show a deep blundering in the understanding of the meaning
of the quantum formalism. On the one hand, experiments seem to rule out individuals but, on
the other hand, the mathematics (set theory) used to formulate quantum mechanics presupposes
the notion of individuality. Furthermore, we agree with Michael Readhead and Paul Teller when
they say that:
“Interpreters of quantum mechanics largely agree that classical concepts do not
apply without alteration or restriction to quantum objects. In Bohr’s formulation
this means that one cannot simultaneously apply complementary concepts, such as
position and momentum, without restriction. In particular, this means that one
cannot attribute classical, well defined trajectories to quantum systems. But in a
more fundamental respect it would seem that physicists, including Bohr, continue to
think of quantum objects classically as individual things, capable, at least conceptu-
ally, of bearing labels. It is this presumption and its implications which we need to
understand and critically examine.” M. Readhead and P. Teller ([30], p.202)
To deal with the indistinguishability of quanta we believe, along with Krause [31], that
quantum set theories —which incorporate quantum non individuality without using particle
labeling— deserve further investigation. We also believe that it is an interesting task to con-
struct a Fock-space formalism using quasiset theory, thus avoiding intermediate indexations and
incorporating quantum indistinguishability “right from the start” [13].
2.2 Quantum individuals: Kochen-Specker theorem and superpositions
Up to now, we have discussed individuality and identity in the case of the statistical properties of
indistinguishable quanta. We go now a step further and claim that the failure of the applicability
of the notion of individuality occurs in a more general frame. Indeed, it occurs within the whole
structure of quantum mechanics.
Let us consider the set L of physical properties of a quantum system. The formalism of
the theory associates to each physical magnitude a mathematical object —an operator, called
“observable”, over the Hilbert space of states of the system— and the Heisenberg principle
states that not all magnitudes may posses (accurate) values at the same time. This must not
be interpreted as a consequence of our ignorance or of our inexact procedures to determine
6See, for example, [18].
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them. Only subsets of ‘compatible’ magnitudes may simultaneously posses values. The inde-
termination of the values of incompatible pairs is a matter of principle. In fact, it is one of
the fundamental physical principles from which the formal structure of the theory may be de-
rived. In mathematical terms, observables linked by the Heisenberg principle do not commute
and thus, physical magnitudes obey a non-commutative algebra —technically, the projectors in
which they decompose are structured in a modular lattice in the finite case. This is strongly
different from the classical realm —where they are structured in a Boolean lattice— and thus
there exist (Boolean) valuations of all propositions about physical magnitudes. The different
algebraic structure of the quantum properties has as its counterpart the different meaning of
the logical connectives among propositions regarding properties. Thus, if we naively try to in-
terpret them as classical properties, as properties ‘possessed by the system’, we are faced to all
kind of no-go theorems that preclude this possibility. Most remarkably is the Kochen-Specker
(KS) theorem [19] which explicitly shows the fact that within the formal structure of quantum
mechanics, it is not possible to jointly assign truth values to different not-disjoint subsets of
mutually compatible properties. This is a very strong impediment to get an image of quantum
systems in some sense close to classical objects. Continuing with the investigation in [28, 29], we
claim that the conclusion which must be driven from the KS theorem is that the quantum wave
function cannot be conceived in terms of the state of an individual which possesses properties.
The possible mathematical representations which expose the quantum wave function from dif-
ferent basis cannot be interpreted as related to properties which preexist simultaneously. Thus,
the KS theorem shows the impossibility to unify the different representations in a unique and
singular ‘whole’, in something which can be considered as an individual.
However, not even when a single basis —a particular mathematical representation to express
the state of the system— is taken into account we can return so easily to the notion of individual
without contradicting the formalism of the theory. In general, a quantum state (expanded in
a chosen basis) is a linear combination of the elements of the basis. This is what is called a
superposition. Paul Dirac called special attention with respect to its importance:
“The nature of the relationships which the superposition principle requires to
exist between the states of any system is of a kind that cannot be explained in terms
of familiar physical concepts. One cannot in the classical sense picture a system
being partly in each of two states and see the equivalence of this to the system being
completely in some other state. There is an entirely new idea involved, to which one
must get accustomed and in terms of which one must proceed to build up an exact
mathematical theory, without having any detailed classical picture.” P. Dirac ([8],
p.12)
The idea of regarding a superposition as representing the state of an individual that possess
properties does not work.7 A superposition is a pondered by complex numbers sum of various
states of the system. Let us suppose that one of them is ‘up’ and the other is ‘down’ (or
‘dead’ and ‘alive’, as is the case in the famous example of poor Schro¨dinger’s cat [33]). We
immediately recognize that both states ‘up’ and ‘down’ cannot be the simultaneous states of the
same individual entity. The relationship between the states in the superposition is what Dirac
points out as remaining far away from our familiar physical concepts.
According to the principle of contradiction —that which Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant con-
sidered as the most certain of all principles— everything is or is not the case. But, if we think
of the components of the superposition as states which exist simultaneously, we are faced to
a contradiction. To escape from it, attempts were made to interpret the superposition as a
mathematical object expressing that the system is in one of its (unknown) state components. In
which one of them, would be ‘discovered’ by measurement. Measurement would then reveal the
7See also [28] for discussion of the principle of superposition in relation to the notion of entity.
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‘true’ state of the system. But we know this idea is simply wrong as has been shown through
various theorems [25]. It is not possible to provide an ignorance interpretation of the elements of
a superposition. The elements of the superposition do not exist in the mode of being of actuality,
the only mode of being which we are accustomed to call real.
All these considerations confront ourselves, as in the case of indistinguishable quanta, with
serious difficulties to interpret the formalism in terms of individual entities. If one firmly believes
that such a thing as a superposition refers to something which has physical existence —and this
is what quantum mechanics tells us if taken seriously— it seems we might be in the need of
creating a new way of dealing with these elements of the quantum formalism, a way which should
not depend on the classical idea of individual entity.
3 Superposition of the one and the many
In general, when physicists say that quantum systems have an undefined ‘particle number’, it
may be understood that the number of particles varies in time because the system is open or
because particles are created or destroyed. Thus, it may be presupposed that the state of affairs
is such that a definite particle number can be attributed to the system even when one does
not know it at every instant of time. In this frame, the Fock-space formalism is used because,
within it, superpositions of states corresponding to different particle numbers are allowed. But
the question arises of how many particles are encompassed in such a superposition state.
3.1 How many?
Performing a single measurement over a quantum system does not allow, as we have already
discussed, to attribute the result of the measurement to a property which the system possessed
before the measurement was performed without giving rise to serious problems. This is also
the case when the said property is the ‘number of particles’ of the system. Suppose that the
state is a superposition of two elementary states representing ‘two particles’ and ‘five particles’.
The coefficients in the superposition, i.e. the numbers that ponder the elementary states in
the sum, allow to predict the probability of obtaining two or five particles (no other result is
allowed) when performing a measurement. Now, suppose that five particles are detected in a
single measurement. We still cannot attribute this finding to the actual state before the process
of measurement because the number of particles was not definite. The assertion that this is so
because the number of particles may be varying in time for particles are being constantly created
and destroyed, assumes that at each instant of time the number of particles is a determined
definite value, a statement inconsistent with the formalism.
The conclusion that we are forced to derive from the formalism is that a system in a state
that is a superposition of several defined particle number states has no cardinal. In other words,
we claim that the particle number is indefinite in the same sense as any other property when
we deal with a superposition. There are only few particular cases in which the cardinal can
be considered to be definite valued —when the state is an eigenstate of the particle number
operator— or in which we can attribute to ignorance the indetermination in the cardinal —
when the state is a statistical mixture of defined number states. But, in the general case, the
incapability of knowing the particle number does not come from our ignorance about the system
but from the fact that the cardinal does not exist. It is important to point out one more time
that the so called ‘particle number’ only appears, in general, after the measurement process is
performed. And, as the result of a measurement cannot be attributed in general to a property
pertaining to a system, ‘counting’ in quantum mechanics is qualitatively different from counting
the quantity of elements of classical systems.
In which sense do we talk about quantum systems composed for example by a single photon?
What do we mean when we use the words ‘single photon’? Experiments on quantum systems
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sometimes show corpuscular features, and this suggests an idea of individuality. This idea
is a base for developing the concept of ‘particle’ and subsequently, the notion of ‘particles
aggregate’. But these are definite experimental arrangements which force the appearance of
particle characteristics as a final result of a single process. Experiments are designed to find out
which is the particle number, but this does not mean that the resulting number pertains to the
system under study. On the contrary, it refers to the definite process which takes place in each
measurement. We are not allowed to consider the system as an aggregate of individuals as if
they were simple objects.
3.2 What would an adequate formalism be like?
How would the characteristics be of an ontology which is not founded on entities? It is hard to
imagine it, but we can suspect that ‘to have a definite number’ would not necessarily need to be a
principal characteristic of it. To have a definite number, is something to which entities are always
tied. Thus, it would not be surprising that a Fock-space formulation of quantum mechanics
based on quasi-set theory would be more adequate than the wave mechanics formulation. If
we accept that physics refers in some sense to Being, this could be considered as an interesting
example about how we could speak about Being without appealing to entities. Something which
is not an individual entity, needs not to be a one, nor a many. The (historically constructed)
notion of ‘number’ needs not to be applied to it. Therefore, that which is expressed through
a superposition is not a one, nor a many, but notwithstanding, it is. In order to provide a
formalism which comprises the mentioned features we have proposed an alternative procedure
([13], [14]) that resembles that of the Fock-space formalism but based on quasiset theory Q
which genuinely avoids artificial labeling.
We briefly review first the main ideas of quasi-set theory Q following mainly [23]. Intuitively
speaking, Q is obtained by applying ZFU-like (Zermelo-Fraenkel plus Urelemente) axioms to a
basic domain composed ofm-atoms (the new ingredients that stand for indistinguishable quanta,
and to which the usual concept of identity does not apply), M -atoms and aggregates of them.
The theory still admits a primitive concept of quasi-cardinal, which intuitively stands for the
‘quantity’ of objects in a collection. This is made so that certain quasi-sets x (in particular, those
whose elements are q-objects) may have a quasi-cardinal, written qc(x), but not an associated
ordinal. It is also possible to define a translation from the language of ZFU into the language of
Q in such a way so that there is a ‘copy’ of ZFU in Q (the ‘classical’ part of Q). In this copy, all
the usual mathematical concepts can be defined (inclusive the concept of ordinal for the Q-sets,
the copy of standard sets in Q), and the Q-sets turn out to be those quasi-sets whose transitive
closure (this concept is like the usual one) does not contain m-atoms.
In Q, ‘pure’ quasi-sets have only m-atoms as elements (although these elements may be not
always indistinguishable from one another), and to them it is assumed that the usual notion of
identity cannot be applied (the expressions x = y and its negation, x 6= y, are not well formed
formulas if either x or y stand for m-atoms). Notwithstanding, there is a primitive relation ≡
of indistinguishability having the properties of an equivalence relation, and a defined concept of
extensional identity, not holding among m-atoms, which has the properties of standard identity
of classical set theories. More precisely, we write x =E y (x and y are extensionally identical)
iff they are both qsets having the same elements (that is, ∀z(z ∈ x←→ z ∈ y)) or they are both
M -atoms and belong to the same qsets (that is, ∀z(x ∈ z ←→ y ∈ z)). From now on, we shall
use the symbol “=” for the extensional equality, except when explicitly mentioned.
Since the elements of a quasi-set may have properties (and satisfy certain formulas), they can
be regarded as indistinguishable without turning to be identical (that is, being the same object),
that is, x ≡ y does not entail x = y. Since the relation of equality (and the concept of identity)
does not apply to m-atoms, they can also be thought of as entities devoid of individuality. For
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details about Q and about its historical motivations, see [17, Chap. 7].
One of the main features of Q is its ability to take into account in ‘set-theoretical terms’
the non observability of permutations in quantum physics, which is one of the most basic facts
regarding indistinguishable quanta. In standard set theories, if w ∈ x, then of course (x−{w})∪
{z} = x iff z = w. That is, we can ‘exchange’ (without modifying the original arrangement) two
elements iff they are the same element, by force of the axiom of extensionality. But in Q there
is a theorem guarantying the unobservability of permutations; in other words,
Theorem 3.1. Let x be a finite quasi-set such that x does not contain all indistinguishable from
z, where z is an m-atom such that z ∈ x. If w ≡ z and w /∈ x, then there exists w′ such that
(x− z′) ∪ w′ ≡ x
Here z′ and w′ stand for a quasi-set with quasi-cardinal 1 whose only element is indistin-
guishable (but not identical) from z and w respectively.
We outline now the construction of the state space VQ that respects indistinguishability in all
steps working within Q, mainly following [13] and [14]. Let us consider a quasi-set ǫ = {ǫi}i∈I ,
where I is an arbitrary collection of indexes (this makes sense in the ‘classical part’ of Q). We
take the elements ǫi to represent the eigenvalues of a physical magnitude of interest. Consider
then the quasi-functions f (this concept generalizes that of function), f : ǫ −→ Fp, where Fp
is the quasi-set formed of finite and pure quasi-sets. f is the quasi-set formed of ordered pairs
〈ǫi;x〉 with ǫi ∈ ǫ and x ∈ Fp. Let us choice these quasi-functions in such a way that whenever
〈ǫik ;x〉 and 〈ǫik′ ; y〉 belong to f and k 6= k
′, then x∩y = ∅. Let us further assume that the sum of
the quasi-cardinals of the quasi-sets which appear in the image of each of these quasi-functions
is finite, and then, qc(x) = 0 for every x in the image of f , except for a finite number of elements
of ǫ. Let us call F the quasi-set formed of these quasi-functions. If 〈x; ǫi〉 is a pair of f ∈ F , we
will interpret that the energy level ǫi has occupation number qc(x). These quasi-functions will
be represented by symbols such as fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫim (or by the same symbol with permuted indexes).
This indicates that the levels ǫi1ǫi2 . . . ǫim are occupied. It will be taken as convention that if
the symbol ǫik appears j-times, then the level ǫik has occupation number j. The levels that do
not appear have occupation number zero.
It is important to point out that the order of the indexes in fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin has no meaning at
all because up to now, there is no need to define any particular order in ǫ, the domain of the
quasi-functions of F . Nevertheless, we may define an order in the following way. For each
quasi-function f ∈ F , let {ǫi1ǫi2 . . . ǫim} be the quasi-set formed by the elements of ǫ such that
〈ǫik ,X〉 ∈ f and qc(X) 6= 0 (k = 1 . . . m). We call supp(f) this quasi-set (the support of f). Then
consider the pair 〈o, f〉, where o is a bijective quasi-function o : {ǫi1ǫi2 . . . ǫim} −→ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Each of these quasi-functions o define an order on supp(f). For each f ∈ F , if qc(supp(f)) = m,
then, there are m! orderings. Then, let OF be the quasi-set formed by all the pairs 〈o, f〉, where
f ∈ F and o is a a particular ordering in supp(f). Thus, OF is the quasi-set formed by all
the quasi-functions of F with ordered support. For this reason, fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin ∈ OF refers to a
quasifunction f ∈ F and a special ordering of {ǫi1ǫi2 . . . ǫin}. For the sake of simplicity, we will
use the same notation as before. But now the order of the indexes is meaningful. It is also
important to remark, that the order on the indexes must not be understood as a labeling of
particles, for it easy to check, as above, that the permutation of particles does not give place
to a new element of OF . This is so because a permutation of particles operating on a pair
〈o, f〉 ∈ OF will not change f , and so, will not alter the ordering. We will use the elements of
OF later, when we deal with fermions.
A linear space structure is required to adequately represent quantum states. To equip F
and OF with such a structure, we need to define two operations “⋆” and “+”, a product by
scalars and an addition of their elements, respectively. Call C the collection of quasi-functions
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which assign to every f ∈ F (or f ∈ OF) a complex number (again, built in the ‘classical part’
of Q). That is, a quasi-function c ∈ C is a collection of ordered pairs 〈f ;λ〉, where f ∈ F
(or f ∈ OF) and λ a complex number. Let C0 be the subset of C such that, if c ∈ C0, then
c(f) = 0 for almost every f ∈ OF (i.e., c(f) = 0 for every f ∈ OF except for a finite number of
quasi-functions). We can define in C0 a sum and a product by scalars in the same way as it is
usually done with functions as follows:
Definition 3.2. Let α, β and γ ∈ C, and c, c1 and c2 be quasi-functions of C0, then
(γ ∗ c)(f) := γ(c(f)) and (c1 + c2)(f) := c1(f) + c2(f)
The quasi-function c0 ∈ C0 such that c0(f) = 0, for any f ∈ F , acts as the null element of the
sum, for (c0 + c)(f) = c0(f) + c(f) = 0 + c(f) = c(f),∀f. With the sum and the multiplication
by scalars defined above we have that (C0,+, ∗) is a complex vector space. Each one of the
quasi-functions of C0 should be interpreted in the following way: if c ∈ C0 (and c 6= c0), let f1,
f2, f3,. . ., fn be the only functions of C0 which satisfy c(fi) 6= 0 (i = 1, . . . , n). These quasi-
functions exist because, as we have said above, the quasi-functions of C0 are zero except for a
finite number of quasi-functions of F . If λi are complex numbers which satisfy that c(fi) = λi
(i = 1, . . . , n), we will make the association c ≈ (λ1f1+ λ2f2+ · · ·+ λnfn). The symbol ≈ must
be understood in the sense that we use this notation to represent the quasi-function c. The idea
is that the quasi-function c represents the pure state which is a linear combination of the states
represented by the quasi-functions fi according to the interpretation given above.
In order to calculate probabilities and mean values, we have to introduce a scalar product,
in fact two of them: ◦ for bosons and • for fermions, thus obtaining two (normed) vector spaces
(VQ, ◦) and (VQ, •) :
Definition 3.3. Let δij be the Kronecker symbol and fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin and fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′m
two basis vectors,
then
fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin ◦ fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′m
:= δnm
∑
p
δi1pi′1δi2pi′2 . . . δinpi′n
The sum is extended over all the permutations of the set i′ = (i′
1
, i′
2
, . . . , i′n) and for each permu-
tation p, pi′ = (pi′
1
, pi′
2
, . . . , pi′n).
This product can be easily extended over linear combinations.
Definition 3.4. Let δij be the Kronecker symbol, fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin and fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′m
two basis vectors,
then
fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin • fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′m
:= δnm
∑
p
σpδi1pi′1δi2pi′2 . . . δinpi′n
where: sp = +1 if p is even and sp = −1 if p is odd.
The result of this second product • is an antisymmetric sum of the indexes which appear
in the quasi-functions. In order that the product is well defined, the quasi-functions must
belong to OF . Once this product is defined over the basis functions, we can extend it to linear
combinations, in a similar way as for bosons. If the occupation number of a product is more
or equal than two, then the vector has null norm. As it is a vector of null norm, the product
of this vector with any other vector of the space would yield zero, and thus the probability of
observing a system in a state like it vanishes. This means that we can add to any physical state
an arbitrary linear combination of null norm vectors for they do not contribute to the scalar
product, which is the meaningful quantity.
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With these tools and using the language of Q, the formalism of QM may be completely
rewritten giving a straightforward answer to the problem of giving a formulation of QM in
which intrinsical indistinguishability is taken into account from the beginning, without artifi-
cially introducing extra postulates. We make the following association in order to turn the
notation similar to that of the standard formalism. For each quasi-function fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin of the
quasi-sets F or OF constructed above, we will write αfǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin := α|ǫi1ǫi2 . . . ǫin) with the
obvious corresponding generalization for linear combinations. Once normalized to unity, the
states constructed using Q, are equivalent to the symmetrized vectors for bosonic states and
we have shown that commutation relations equivalent to the usual ones hold, thus being both
formulations equivalent for bosons.
For fermions, there are some subtleties involved in the construction. First of all, let us recall
the action of the creation operator c†α: let ζ represent a collection of indexes with non null
occupation number, then C†α|ζ) = |αζ). If α was already in the collection ζ, then |αζ) is a
vector with null norm. As said above, to have null norm implies that (ψ|αζ) = 0 for all |ψ).
Moreover, if a linear combination of null norm vectors were added to the vector representing the
state of a system, this addition would not give place to observable results because the terms of
null norm do not contribute to the mean values or to the probabilities. In order to express this
situation, we define the following relation:
Definition 3.5. Two vectors |ϕ) and |ψ) are similar (and we will write |ϕ) ∼= |ψ))) if the
difference between them is a linear combination of null norm vectors.
With all of this, it is straightforward to demonstrate the equivalence of the anticommutation
relations in VQ and in the standard Fock-space. Thus, we can conclude that both formulations
are equivalent also for fermions. To avoid particle labeling in the expressions for observables, in
Fock-space formalism they are written in terms of creation and annihilation operators.
4 Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics
We have argued against forcing the interpretation of the quantum formalism in terms of actual
individuals. In view of the difficulties posed by the theory to give place to actual entities,
modal interpretations of QM attempt to consider the role of possible properties in the orthodox
quantum formalism giving place to a consistent discourse about possible entities.
Modal interpretations have continued the footprints left by Niels Bohr, Max Born, Werner
Heisenberg and Wolfgang Pauli and continued the path on the lines drawn by Bas van Fraassen,
Simon Kochen, Dennis Dieks and many others, searching for the different possibilities of inter-
preting the formalism of the theory.8 Modal interpretations may be thought to be a study of the
constraints under which one is able to talk a consistent classical discourse without contradiction
with the quantum formalism. Following the general outline provided in [11] one might state in
general terms that a modal interpretation is best characterized by the following points:
1. One of the most significant features of modal interpretations is that they stay close to
the standard formulation. Following van Fraassen’s recommendation, one needs to learn
from the formal structure of the theory in order to develop an interpretation. This is
different from many attempts which presuppose an ontology and then try to fit it into the
formalism.
2. Modal interpretations are non-collapse interpretations. The evolution is always given by
the Schro¨dinger equation of motion and the collapse of the wave function is nothing but
the path from the possible to the actual, it is not considered a physical process.
8 See for example [6, 20, 38, 39].
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3. Modal interpretations ascribe possible properties to quantum systems. The property as-
cription depends on the states of the systems and applies regardless of whether or not
measurements are performed. There is a distinction between the level of possibility and
that of actuality which are related through an interpretational rule. (Technically, in addi-
tion to actual properties interpreted in the orthomodular lattice L of quantum logic, there
is a set of possible properties ⋄L which may be regarded as constituting the center of the
enriched lattice.)
4. Modality is not interpreted in terms of ignorance. There is no ignorance interpretation of
the probability distribution assigned to the physical properties. The state of the system
determines all there is to know. For modal interpretations there is no such thing as ‘hidden
variables’ from which we could get more information. One can formulate a KS theorem
for modalities which expresses the irreducible contextual character of quantum mechanics
even in the case of enriching its language with a modal operator.
4.1 ‘Possible’ individuals?
Modal interpretations intend to discuss about systems with properties going beyond the instru-
mentalist positions which only talk about measurement outcomes. However, it is not obvious
which properties can be considered as possessing definite values. In particular there are several
no-go theorems which restrict this possibility [1, 41].
Still today there is a tension in modal interpretations which has not been solved. Although
Bacciagaluppi claims that “despite the name, the modal interpretation in the version of Vermaas
and Dieks is a theory about actualities” ([2], p.74), Dieks still seems to present a different
position:
“[...] according to modal interpretations the quantum formalism does not tell us
what actually is the case in the physical world, but rather provides us with a list of
possibilities and their probabilities. The modal viewpoint is therefore that quantum
theory is about what may be the case, in philosophical jargon, quantum theory is
about modalities.” D. Dieks ([7])
It might be thought that such interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of modalities opens
the door to a new way to refer to individuals, not in terms of actuality but rather in terms of
possibilities. Thus, one might speak about ‘possible individuals’ instead of ‘actual individuals’.
At first sight, one might think it is still achievable to recover the notion of individuality and
identity in quantum mechanics if one is careful enough to remain within the realm of possibility.
But, once again, the quantum formalism is ready to stop any move which intends to constrain its
interpretation within the notion of individuality. In fact, a theorem has been developed which
precludes to consistently interpret the formalism in terms of ‘possible individuals’.
4.2 Limits of modality: the MKS theorem
In order to stay away from inconsistencies when speaking about properties which pertain to the
system, one must acknowledge the limitations imposed by the KS theorem. To do so, modal
interpretations assign to the system only a set of definite properties. This is not achievable when
talking about properties which pertain to different contexts (see for discussion [3]).
At first sight it might seem paradoxical that, even though modal interpretations of quantum
mechanics talk about modalities, KS theorem refers to actual values of physical properties.
Elsewhere, and following the line of thought of quantum logic, we have investigated the question
whether KS theorem has something to say about possibility and its relation to actuality [9, 12].
The answer was provided via a characterization of the relations between actual and possible
11
properties pertaining to different contexts. By applying algebraic and topological tools we
studied the structure of the orthomodular lattice of actual propositions enriched with modal
propositions. Let us briefly recall the results. As usual, given a proposition about the system, it
is possible to define a context from which one can predicate with certainty about it (and about a
set of propositions that are compatible with it) and predicate probabilities about the other ones.
This is to say that one may predicate truth or falsity of all possibilities at the same time, i.e.
possibilities allow an interpretation in a classical system of propositions. In order to describe
rigorously the formalism which allows to capture all propositions in a single structure, let L be
an orthomodular lattice. Given a, b, c in L, we write: (a, b, c)D iff (a∨ b)∧ c = (a∧ c)∨ (b∧ c);
(a, b, c)D∗ iff (a ∧ b) ∨ c = (a ∨ c) ∧ (b ∨ c) and (a, b, c)T iff (a, b, c)D, (a,b,c)D∗ hold for all
permutations of a, b, c. An element z ∈ L is called central iff for all elements a, b ∈ L we have
(a, b, z)T . We denote by Z(L) the set of all central elements of L and it is called the center of
L. Z(L) is a Boolean sublattice of L [24, Theorem 4.15].
Let P be a proposition about a system and consider it as an element of an orthomodular
lattice L. If we refer with ✸P to the possibility of P , then ✸P will be a central element of L.
This interpretation of the possibility in terms of the Boolean algebra of central elements of L
reflects the fact that one can simultaneously predicate about all possibilities. This is so because
it is always possible to establish Boolean homomorphisms of the form v : Z(L)→ 2. Therefore,
the key idea is to expand the orthomodular structure in such a way to include propositions
about possibility. This expansion is performed in the following way: If P is a proposition
about the system and P occurs, then it is trivially possible that P occurs. This is expressed
as P ≤ ✸P . In fact, to assume an actual property and a complete set of properties that
are compatible with it determines a context in which the classical discourse holds. Classical
consequences that are compatible with it, for example probability assignments to the actuality
of other propositions, shear the classical frame. These consequences are the same ones as those
which would be obtained by considering the original actual property as a possible property. This
is interpreted as, if P is a property of the system, ✸P is the smallest central element greater than
P . With these tools, we are able to give an extension of the orthomodular structure by adding a
possibility operator that fulfills the mentioned requirements. More precisely, the extension is a
class of algebras, called Boolean saturated orthomodular lattices, that admits the orthomodular
structure as a reduct and we demonstrate that they are a variety, i.e., definable by equations.
If L is an orthomodular lattice and L✸ a Boolean saturated orthomodular one such that
L can be embedded in L✸, we say that L✸ is a modal extension of L. Given L and a modal
extension L✸, we define the possibility space as the subalgebra of L✸ generated by {✸P : P ∈ L}.
We denote by ✸L this space and it may be proved that it is a Boolean subalgebra of the modal
extension. The possibility space represents the modal content added to the discourse about
properties of the system.
Within this frame, the actualization of a possible property acquires a rigorous meaning. Let
L be an orthomodular lattice, (Wi)i∈I the family of Boolean sublattices of L and L
✸ a modal
extension of L. If f : ✸L → 2 is a Boolean homomorphism, an actualization compatible with f
is a global valuation (vi :Wi → 2)i∈I such that vi | Wi ∩✸L = f | Wi ∩✸L for each i ∈ I.
Compatible actualizations represent the passage from possibility to actuality. When taking
into account compatible actualizations from different contexts, the following KS theorem for
modalities can be proved [9]:
Theorem 4.1. Let L be an orthomodular lattice. Then L admits a global valuation iff for each
possibility space there exists a Boolean homomorphism f : ✸L → 2 that admits a compatible
actualization.
The modal KS (MKS) theorem shows that no enrichment of the language about actual
properties results in something close to a classical image. The conclusion which can be derived
from the MKS theorem is that the formalism of quantum mechanics does not only deny the
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possibility of talking about an ‘actual entity’, but even the term ‘possible entity’ remains a
meaningless notion within its domain of discourse.
5 Departing from Plato’s footnotes
Nietzsche and Heidegger claim that the tradition initiated by Aristotle and followed by the rest
of the subsequent occidental philosophers of thinking Being in terms of entities needs to be
criticized. From the landscape of quantum mechanics we may argue that all investigations point
in the direction of its incompatibility with the notion of entity. First, a quantum system cannot
be thought in terms of the unity of its properties because there always exist incompatible prop-
erties and besides, it is inconsistent to say that properties pertain to it, not even those measured
properties. This is also the fact when the brought up property is the number of particles in the
system. Furthermore, it is not allowed to consider ‘possible entities’, because they fall under
analogous criticisms to those of actual ones. Last in our series of examples, indistinguishable
quanta show similar lacking of individuality when being considered in a collection, which cause
a different statistical behavior than that of classical aggregates. Perhaps, this is the time in
physics in which we need to abandon the Aristotelian tradition of thinking the world in terms
of entities, in order to make a cogent picture of quantum phenomena.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank the organizers of the conference and specially to Karin Verelst and Wim
Christiaens for their invitation. G. Domenech is fellow of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones
Cient´ıficas y Te´cnicas (CONICET). This work was partially supported by the following grants:
PICT 04-17687 (ANPCyT), PIP No 6461/05 (CONICET) and UBACyT No X081 and Projects
of the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders G.0362.03 and G.0452.04.
References
[1] G. Bacciagaluppi, A Kochen Specker Theorem in the Modal Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics, International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 34 (1995), 1205–1216.
[2] G. Bacciagaluppi, “Topics in the Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”, Thesis
submitted for the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy, University of Cambridge, 31st May
1996.
[3] G. Bacciagaluppi and P.E. Vermaas, Virtual Reality: Consequences of No-Go Theorems
for Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. In “Language, Quantum, Music´´, 117–
128, M. Dalla Chiara, F. Laudisa and R. Giuntini (Eds.), Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1999.
[4] M.L. Dalla Chiara, R. Giuntini and D. Krause, Quasiset theories for microobjects: a com-
parison. In “Interpreting Bodies”, 142–152, E. Castelani (Ed.), Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1998.
[5] M.L. Dalla Chiara, and R. Giuntini, Quantum logic, in “Handbook of Philosophical
Logic”, vol VI, G. Gabbay and F. Guenther (Eds), Kluver, Dordrecht, 2002. arXiv:
quant-ph/0101028
13
[6] D. Dieks, The Formalism of Quantum Theory: An Objective description of reality, Annalen
der Physik, 7 (1988), 174–190.
[7] D. Dieks, Quantum Mechanics: An Intelligible Description of Objective Reality?, Founda-
tions of Physiscs, 35 (2005), 399–415.
[8] P.A.M. Dirac, “The principle of quantum mechanics”, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1958.
[9] G. Domenech, H. Freytes and C. de Ronde, Scopes and limits of modality in quantum
mechanics, Annalen der Physik, 15 (2006), 853–860, arXiv: quant-ph/0612226.
[10] G. Domenech, and F. Holik, A discussion on particle number and quantum indistinguisha-
bility, Foundations of Physics, 37 (2007), 855–878, arXiv:quant-ph/0705.3417v1.
[11] G. Domenech, H. Freytes and de Ronde, The Contextual Character of Modal Interpretations
of Quantum Mechanics, arXiv: quant-ph/0705.1660.
[12] G. Domenech, H. Freytes and C. de Ronde, “A Topological Study of Contextuality and
Modality in Quantum Mechanics”, International Journal Theoretical Physics, 47 (2008),
168-174, arXiv: quant-ph/0612227v1.
[13] G. Domenech, F. Holik and D. Krause, Q-spaces and the foundations of quantum mechanics,
Foundations of Physics, 38 (2008), 969–994, arXiv:quant-ph/0803.4517v1.
[14] G. Domenech, F. Holik, L. Kniznik and D. Krause, No labaling quantum mechanics of indis-
cernible particles, International Journal of Theoretical Physics, in press, 2010, arXiv:quant-
ph/0904.3476.
[15] J.M. Dunn, Quantum mathematics. In PSA 1980, vol. 2, 512–531, P.D. Asquith and R.N.
Gire (Eds.), Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Michigan, 1981.
[16] D. Finkelstein, Quantum sets and Clifford algebras, International Journal Theoretical
Physics, 21 (1982), 489–503.
[17] S. French and D. Krause, “Identity in Physics: A historical, Philosophical, and Formal
Analysis”, Oxford University Press, London, 2006.
[18] B.L. Gordon, Ontology Schmontology? Identity, Individuation and Fock Space. In PSA
2002 URL = http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001072/.
[19] S. Kochen and E. Specker, On the problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics,
Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics, 17 (1967), 59–87.
[20] S. Kochen, A New Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In “Symposium on the founda-
tions of Modern Physics 1985”, 151–169, P.Lathi and P. Mittelslaedt (Eds.), World Scien-
tific, Johensuu, 1985.
[21] D. Krause, On a quasi-set theory, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 33 (1992), 402–411.
[22] D. Krause, Axioms for collections of indistinguishable objects, Logique et Analyse, 153-154
(1996), 69–93.
14
[23] D. Krause, A. Sant’Anna and A. Sartorelli, A critical study on the concept of identity
in Zermelo-Fraenkel like axioms and its relationship with quantum statistics, Logique and
Analyse, 189-192 (2005), 231–260.
[24] F. Maeda and S. Maeda, “Theory of Symmetric Lattices”, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1970.
[25] P. Mittelstaedt, “The Interpretation of QuantumMechanics and the Measurement Process”,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
[26] H. Nishimura, Empirical sets, International Journal Theoretical Physics, 34 (1995), 229–
352.
[27] C. de Ronde, Understanding QuantumMechanics through the Complementary Descriptions
Approach, arXiv: quant-ph/0705.3850v1.
[28] C. de Ronde, Interpreting the Quantum Wave Function in Terms of ‘Interacting Faculties’,
arXiv: quant-ph/0711.4738v1.
[29] C. de Ronde, No Entity, No Identity, talk presented at the Workshop sobre esctructuras
cua´nticas, AFHIC Congress, Montevideo 2008.
[30] M. Readhead and P. Teller, Particle labels and the theory of indistinguishable particles in
quantum mechanics, The British Journal for the Philosophy of science, 43 (1992), 201–218.
[31] A. Santorelli, D. Krause and A. Sant’Anna, A critical study on the concept of identity
in Zermelo-Fraenkel like axioms and its relationship with quantum statistics, Logique &
Analyse, 189-192 (2005), 231–260.
[32] K-G. Schlesinger, Towards quantum mathematics. I. From quantum set theory to universal
quantum mechanics, Journal of Mathematical Physics, 40 (1999), 1344–1358.
[33] E. Schro¨dinger, Die gegenwa¨rtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik, Naturwissenschaften,
23 (1935), 807–812.
[34] E. Schro¨dinger, “Science and Humanism”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
[35] E. Schro¨dinger, What Is an Elementary Particle. Reprinted in “Interpreting Bodies´´, 197–
210, E. Castellani (Ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998.
[36] G. Takeuti, Quantum set theory. In “Current issues in quantum logic”, 303–322, E. Bel-
trametti et al. (Eds.), Plenum Press, New York, 1981.
[37] G. Toraldo di Franchia, A World of Individual Objects?. In “Interpreting Bodies”, 197–210,
E. Castellani (Ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998.
[38] B.C. van Fraassen, A Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. In “Current Issues in
Quantum Logic”, 229–258, E.G. Beltrametti and B.C. van Fraassen (Eds.), Plenum, New
York, 1981.
[39] B.C. Van Fraassen, “Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View”, Clarendon, Oxford, 1991.
15
[40] K. Verelst and B. Coecke, Early Greek Thought and perspectives for the Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics: Preliminaries to an Ontological Approach. In The Blue Book of
Einstein Meets Magritte, 163–196, D. Aerts (Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
1999.
[41] P.E. Vermaas, A No-Go Theorem for Joint Property Ascriptions in Modal Interpretation,
Physics Review Letters, 78 (1997), 2033–2037.
[42] A.N. Whitehead, “Process and Reality”, The Free Press, New York, 1929.
16
